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Abstract. In this paper we address the problem of protecting elliptic
curve scalar multiplication implementations against side-channel analysis
by using the atomicity principle. First of all we reexamine classical as-
sumptions made by scalar multiplication designers and we point out that
some of them are not relevant in the context of embedded devices. We
then describe the state-of-the-art of atomic scalar multiplication and pro-
pose an atomic pattern improvement method. Compared to the most ef-
ficient atomic scalar multiplication published so far, our technique shows
an average improvement of up to 10.6%.
Keywords: Elliptic Curves, Scalar Multiplication, Atomicity, Side-Chan-
nel Analysis.
1 Introduction
1.1 Preamble
We consider the problem of performing scalar multiplication on elliptic curves
over Fp in the context of embedded devices such as smart cards. In this con-
text, efficiency and side-channel resistance are of utmost importance. Concerning
the achievement of the first requirement, numerous studies dealing with scalar
multiplication efficiency have given rise to efficient algorithms including sliding-
window and signed representation based methods [19].
Regarding the second requirement, side-channel attacks exploit the fact that
physical leakages of a device (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic radia-
tion, etc) depend on the operations performed and on the variables manipulated.
These attacks can be divided into two groups: the Simple Side-Channel Analysis
(SSCA) [25] which tries to observe a difference of behavior depending on the
value of the secret key by using a single measurement, and the Differential Side-
Channel Analysis (DSCA) [26] which exploits data value leakages by performing
⋆ A part of this work has been done while at Oberthur Technologies.
statistical treatment over several hundreds of measurements to retrieve informa-
tion on the secret key. Since 1996, many proposals have been made to protect
scalar multiplication against these attacks [7, 12, 23]. Amongst them, atomic-
ity introduced by Chevallier-Mames et al. in [9] is one of the most interesting
methods to counteract SSCA. This countermeasure has been widely studied and
Longa recently proposed an improvement for some scalar multiplication algo-
rithms [27].
In this paper we present a new atomicity implementation for scalar multi-
plication, and we detail the atomicity improvement method we employed. This
method can be applied to minimize atomicity implementation cost for sensitive
algorithms with no security loss. In particular our method allows the implemen-
tation of atomic scalar multiplication in embedded devices in a more efficient
way than any of the previous methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We finish this introduction
by describing the scalar multiplication context which we are interested in and
by mentioning an important observation on the cost of field additions. In Sec-
tion 2 we recall some basics about Elliptic Curves Cryptography. In particular
we present an efficient scalar multiplication algorithm introduced by Joye in
2008 [21]. Then we recall in Section 3 the principle of atomicity and we draw
up a comparative chart of the efficiency of atomic scalar multiplication algo-
rithms before this work. In Section 4, we propose an improvement of the original
atomicity principle. In particular, we show that our method, applied to Joye’s
scalar multiplication, allows a substantial gain of time compared to the original
atomicity principle. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper.
1.2 Context of the Study
We restrict the context of this paper to practical applications on embedded
devices which yields the constraint of using standardized curves over Fp
4. As far
as we know, NIST curves [17] and Brainpool curves [14,15] cover almost all curves
currently used in the industry. We thus exclude from our scope Montgomery
curves [32], Hessian curves [20], and Edwards curves5 [16] which do not cover
NIST neither Brainpool curves.
Considering that embedded devices – in particular smart cards – have very
constrained resources (i.e. RAM and CPU), methods requiring heavy scalar
treatment are discarded as well. In particular it is impossible to store scalar pre-
computations for some protocols such as ECDSA [1] where the scalar is randomly
generated before each scalar multiplication. Most of the recent advances in this
4 The curves over Fp are generally recommended for practical applications [33,34].
5 An elliptic curve over Fp is expressible in Edwards form only if it has a point of
order 4 [6] and is expressible in twisted Edwards form only if it has three points
of order 2 [4]. Since NIST and Brainpool curves have a cofactor of 1 there is not
such equivalence. Nevertheless, for each of these curves, it is possible to find an
extension field Fpq over which the curve has a point of order 4 and is thus birationally
equivalent to an Edwards curve. However the cost of a scalar multiplication over Fpq
is prohibitive in the context of embedded devices.
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field cannot thus be taken into account: Double Base Number System [13, 31],
multibase representation [28], Euclidean addition chains and Zeckendorf repre-
sentation [30].
1.3 On the Cost of Field Additions
In the literature, the cost of additions and subtractions over Fp is generally
neglected compared to the cost of field multiplication. While this assumption
is relevant in theory, we found out that these operations were not as insignifi-
cant as predicted for embedded devices. Smart cards for example have crypto-
coprocessors in order to perform multi-precision arithmetic. These devices gener-
ally offer the following operations: addition, subtraction, multiplication, modular
multiplication and sometimes modular squaring. Modular addition (respectively
subtraction) must therefore be carried out by one classical addition (resp. sub-
traction) and one conditional subtraction (resp. addition) which should always
be performed – i.e. the effective operation or a dummy one – for SSCA immunity.
Moreover every operation carried out by the coprocessor requires a constant ex-
tra software processing δ to configure the coprocessor. As a result, the cost of
field additions/subtractions is not negligible compared to field multiplications.
Fig. 1 is an electromagnetic radiation measurement during the execution on a
smart card of a 192-bit modular multiplication followed by a modular addition.
Large amplitude blocks represent the 32-bit crypto-coprocessor activity while
those with smaller amplitude are only CPU processing. In this case the time
ratio between modular multiplication and modular addition is approximately
0.3.
Fig. 1. Comparison between modular multiplication (M) and modular addition (A)
timings.
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From experiments on different smart cards provided with an arithmetic co-
processor, we estimated the average cost of modular additions/subtractions com-
pared to modular multiplications. Our results are presented in Table 1 where A
andM denote the cost of a field addition/subtraction and the cost of a field mul-
tiplication respectively. We observe that the average value of A/M for considered
bit lengths is about 0.2.
Bit length 160 192 224 256 320 384 512 521
A/M 0.36 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.09 0.09
Table 1. Measured A/M ratio on smart cards with crypto-coprocessor for NIST and
Brainpool ECC bit lengths.
Another useful field operation is negation in Fp, i.e. the map x→ −x, which
can be carried out by one non-modular subtraction p − x. The cost N of this
operation is therefore half the cost of modular addition/subtraction and thus we
fix N/M = 0.5A/M .
In the following sections we also consider the cost S of field squaring. The
cost of a squaring compared to a multiplication depends on the functionalities
of the corresponding crypto-coprocessor. When a dedicated squaring is available
a commonly accepted value for S/M is 0.8 [8, 18] which is also corroborated by
our experiments. Otherwise squarings must be carried out as multiplications and
the ratio S/M is thus 1.
2 Elliptic Curves
In this section we recall some generalities about elliptic curves, and useful point
representations. Then we present two efficient scalar multiplication algorithms.
Cryptology makes use of elliptic curves over binary fields F2n and large char-
acteristic prime fields Fp. In this study we focus on the latter case and hence
assume p > 3.
2.1 Group Law Over Fp
An elliptic curve E over Fp, p > 3 can be defined as an algebraic curve of affine
Weierstraß equation:
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b (1)
where a, b ∈ Fp and 4a
3 + 27b2 6≡ 0 (mod p).
The set of points of E – i.e. the pairs (x, y) ∈ Fp
2 satisfying (1) –, plus an
extra point O called point at infinity form an abelian group where O is the
neutral element. In the following, we present the corresponding law depending
on the selected point representation.
4
Affine Coordinates. Under the group law a point P = (x1, y1) lying on the
elliptic curve E admits an opposite −P = (x1,−y1).
The sum of P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), with P,Q 6= O and P 6= ±Q, is
the point P +Q = (x3, y3) such that:{
x3 = ((y2 − y1)/(x2 − x1))
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = (x1 − x3)(y2 − y1)/(x2 − x1)− y1
(2)
The double of the point P = (x1, y1), with P 6= O and y1 6= 0, is the point
2P = (x2, y2) as defined below, or O if y1 = 0.
{
x2 = ((3x1
2 + a)/(2y1))
2 − 2x1
y2 = (x1 − x2)(3x1
2 + a)/(2y1)− y1
(3)
Each point addition or point doubling requires an inversion in Fp. This oper-
ation can be very time consuming and leads developers on embedded devices to
use other kinds of representations with which point operations involve no field
inversion. In the following part of this section, we detail two of them.
Jacobian Projective Coordinates. By denoting x = X/Z2 and y = Y/Z3,
Z 6= 0, we obtain the Jacobian projective Weierstraß equation of the elliptic
curve E :
Y 2 = X3 + aXZ4 + bZ6 , (4)
where a, b ∈ Fp and 4a
3+27b2 6= 0. Each point P = (x, y) can be represented by
its Jacobian projective coordinates (q2x : q3y : q) with q ∈ Fp. Conversely, every
point P = (X : Y : Z) different from O can be represented in affine coordinates
by (x, y) = (X/Z2, Y/Z3).
The opposite of a point (X : Y : Z) is (X : −Y : Z) and the point at infinity
O is denoted by the unique point with Z = 0, O = (1 : 1 : 0).
The sum of P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) and Q = (X2 : Y2 : Z2), with P,Q 6= O and
P 6= ±Q, is the point P +Q = (X3 : Y3 : Z3) such that:


X3 = F
2 − E3 − 2AE2
Y3 = F
(
AE2 −X3
)
− CE3
Z3 = Z1Z2E
with
A = X1Z2
2
B = X2Z1
2
C = Y1Z2
3
D = Y2Z1
3
E = B −A
F = D − C
(5)
If P is given in affine coordinates – i.e. Z1 = 1 – it is possible to save up one
field squaring and four multiplications in (5). Such a case is referred to as mixed
affine-Jacobian addition. On the other hand if P has to be added several times,
storing Z1
2 and Z1
3 saves one squaring and one multiplication in all following
additions involving P . This latter case is referred to as readdition.
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The double of the point P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) is the point 2P = (X2 : Y2 : Z2)
such that:


X2 = C
2 − 2B
Y2 = C (B −X2)− 2A
2
Z2 = 2Y1Z1
with
A = 2Y1
2
B = 2AX1
C = 3X1
2 + aZ1
4
(6)
When curve parameter a is −3, doubling can be carried out taking C =
3
(
X1 + Z1
2
) (
X1 − Z1
2
)
which saves two squarings in (6). We denote this op-
eration by fast doubling.
Adding up field operations yields 12M+4S+7A for general addition, 11M+
3S + 7A for readdition, 8M + 3S + 7A for mixed addition, 4M + 6S + 11A for
general doubling formula and 4M + 4S + 12A for fast doubling.
Modified Jacobian Projective Coordinates. This representation, intro-
duced in [11], is derived from the Jacobian projective representation to which a
fourth coordinate is added for computation convenience. In this representation, a
point on the curve E is thus represented by (X : Y : Z : aZ4), where (X : Y : Z)
stands for the Jacobian representation.
Modified Jacobian projective coordinates provide a particularly efficient dou-
bling formula. Indeed, the double of a point P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1 :W1) is given by
2P = (X2 : Y2 : Z2 :W2) such that:


X2 = A
2 − 2C
Y2 = A (C −X2)−D
Z2 = 2Y1Z1
W2 = 2DW1
with
A = 3X1
2 +W1
B = 2Y1
2
C = 2BX1
D = 2B2
(7)
Doubling hence requires only 4M + 4S + 12A for all a values. On the other
hand, addition is less efficient compared to Jacobian projective representation:
by applying formula (5), we need to compute the fourth coordinate which is
required in point doubling, adding an overhead of 1M + 2S [21].
On S–M Trade-Offs. Addition and doubling formulas presented above are
voluntarily not state-of-the-art, see [5]. Indeed, recent advances have provided
Jacobian formulas where some field multiplications have been traded for faster
field squarings [27, Sec. 4.1]. These advances have been achieved by using the
so-called S–M trade-off principle which is based on the fact that computing ab
when a2 and b2 are known can be done as 2ab = (a+ b)2− a2− b2. This allows a
squaring to replace a multiplication since the additional factor 2 can be handled
by considering the representative of the Jacobian coordinates equivalence class
(X : Y : Z) = (22X : 23Y : 2Z).
Nevertheless such trade-offs not only replace field multiplications by field
squarings but also add field additions. In the previous example at least 3 extra
additions have to be performed, thus taking S/M = 0.8 implies that the trade-off
is profitable only if A/M < 0.067 which is never the case with devices considered
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using standardized curves as seen in Section 1.3. These new formulas are thus
not relevant in the context of embedded devices.
2.2 Scalar Multiplication
Generalities. The operation consisting in calculating the multiple of a point
k · P = P + P + · · ·+ P (k times) is called scalar multiplication and the integer
k is thus referred to as the scalar.
Scalar multiplication is used in ECDSA signature [1] and ECDH key agree-
ment [2] protocols. Implementing such protocols on embedded devices requires
particular care from both the efficiency and the security points of view. In-
deed scalar multiplication turns out to be the most time consuming part of the
aforementioned protocols, and since it uses secret values as scalars, side-channel
analysis endangers the security of those protocols.
Most of the scalar multiplication algorithms published so far are derived from
the traditional double and add algorithm. This algorithm can scan the binary
representation of the scalar in both directions which leads to the left-to-right
and right-to-left variants. The former is generally preferred over the latter since
it saves one point in memory.
Moreover since computing the opposite of a point P on an elliptic curve is
virtually free, the most efficient methods for scalar multiplication use signed
digit representations such as the Non-Adjacent Form (NAF) [3]. Under the NAF
representation, an n-bit scalar has an average Hamming weight of n/3 which
implies that one point doubling is performed every bit of scalar and one point
addition is performed every three bits.
In the two next subsections, we present a left-to-right and a right-to-left NAF
scalar multiplication algorithms.
Left To Right Binary NAF Scalar Multiplication. Alg. 1 presents the
classical NAF scalar multiplication algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Left-to-right binary NAF scalar multiplication [19]
Inputs : P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) ∈ E (Fp), k = (kl−1 . . . k1k0)NAF
Output : k · P
1. (X2 : Y2 : Z2)← (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
2. i← l − 2
3. while i ≥ 0 do
(X2 : Y2 : Z2)← 2 · (X2 : Y2 : Z2)
if ki = 1 then
(X2 : Y2 : Z2)← (X2 : Y2 : Z2) + (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
if ki = −1 then
(X2 : Y2 : Z2)← (X2 : Y2 : Z2)− (X1 : Y1 : Z1)
i← i− 1
4. return (X2 : Y2 : Z2)
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Point doubling can be done in Alg. 1 using general Jacobian doubling formula
or fast doubling formula. Since NIST curves fulfill a = −3 and each Brainpool
curve is provided with an isomorphism to a curve with a = −3, we thus assume
that fast doubling is always possible. Point addition can be performed using
mixed addition formula if input points are given in affine coordinates or by
using readdition formula otherwise.
It is possible to reduce the number of point additions by using window tech-
niques6 which need the precomputation of some first odd multiples of the point
P . Table 2 recalls the number of point additions per bit of scalar when having
from 0 (simple NAF) to 4 precomputed points. More than 4 points allows even
better results but seems not practical in the context of constrained memory.
Nb. of precomp. points 0 1 2 3 4
Precomputed points – 3P 3P, 5P 3P, 5P, 7P 3P, . . . , 9P
Point additions / bit 1/3 ≈ 0.33 1/4 = 0.25 2/9 ≈ 0.22 1/5 = 0.20 4/21 ≈ 0.19
Table 2. Average number of point additions per bit of scalar using window NAF
algorithms.
Right To Left Binary NAF Mixed Coordinates Multiplication. We
recall here a very efficient algorithm performing right-to-left NAF scalar multi-
plication. Indeed this algorithm uses the fast modified Jacobian doubling formula
which works for all curves – i.e. for all a – without needing the slow modified
Jacobian addition.
This is achieved by reusing the idea of mixed coordinates scalar multiplica-
tion (i.e. two coordinate systems are used simultaneously) introduced by Cohen,
Ono and Miyaji in [11]. The aim of this approach is to make the best use of
two coordinates systems by processing some operations with one system and
others with the second. Joye proposed in [21] to perform additions by using Ja-
cobian coordinates, doublings – referred to as ∗ – by using modified Jacobian
coordinates, and to compute the NAF representation of the scalar on-the-fly, cf.
Alg. 27.
In the same way as their left-to-right counterpart benefits from precomputed
points, right-to-left algorithms can be enhanced using window techniques if ex-
tra memory is available [22, 35]. In this case precomputations are replaced by
postcomputations the cost of which is negligible for the considered window sizes
and bit lengths.
In [21] the author suggests protecting Alg. 2 against SSCA by using the
so-called atomicity principle. We recall in the next section the principle of this
SSCA countermeasure.
6 By window techniques we mean the sliding window NAF and the Window NAFw
algorithms, see [19] for more details.
7 In Alg. 2, Jacobian addition is assumed to handle the special cases P = ±Q, P = O,
Q = O as discussed in [21].
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Algorithm 2 Right-to-left binary NAF mixed coordinates multiplication [21]
Inputs : P = (X1 : Y1 : Z1) ∈ E (Fp), k
Output : k · P
1. (X2 : Y2 : Z2)← (1 : 1 : 0)
2. (R1 : R2 : R3 : R4)← (X1 : Y1 : Z1 : aZ1
4)
3. while k > 1 do
if k ≡ 1 mod 2 then
u← 2− (k mod 4)
k ← k − u
if u = 1 then
(X2 : Y2 : Z2)← (X2 : Y2 : Z2) + (R1 : R2 : R3)
else
(X2 : Y2 : Z2)← (X2 : Y2 : Z2) + (R1 : −R2 : R3)
k ← k/2
(R1 : R2 : R3 : R4)← 2 ∗ (R1 : R2 : R3 : R4)
4. (X2 : Y2 : Z2)← (X2 : Y2 : Z2) + (R1 : R2 : R3)
5. return (X2 : Y2 : Z2)
3 Atomicity
In this section we recall the principle of atomicity and its application to scalar
multiplication. Other countermeasures exist in order to thwart SSCA such as
regular algorithms [12,22,24] and unified formulas [7,16]. However regular algo-
rithms require costly extra curve operations, and unified formulas for Weierstrass
curves over Fp – only known in the affine and homogeneous coordinate systems,
see [7] – are also very costly. Therefore atomicity turns out to be more efficient
in the context of embedded devices. It is thus natural to compare the efficiency
of the two scalar multiplication methods presented in Section 2.2 protected by
atomicity.
We recall in the following how atomicity is generally implemented on elliptic
curves cryptography, for a complete atomicity principle description see [9].
3.1 State-of-the-Art
The atomicity principle has been introduced in [10]. This countermeasure con-
sists in rewriting all the operations carried out through an algorithm into a
sequence of identical atomic patterns. The purpose of this method is to defeat
SSCA since an attacker has nothing to learn from an uniform succession of iden-
tical patterns.
In the case of scalar multiplications, a succession of point doublings and
point additions is performed. Each of these operations being composed of field
operations, the execution of a scalar multiplication can be seen as a succession of
field operations. The atomicity consists here in rewriting the succession of field
operations into a sequence of identical atomic patterns. The atomic pattern (1)
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proposed in [9] is composed of the following field operations: a multiplication,
two additions and a negation. Ri’s denote the crypto-coprocessor registers.
(1)


R1 ← R2 ·R3
R4 ← R5 +R6
R7 ← −R8
R9 ← R10 +R11
This choice relies on the observation that during the execution of point additions
and point doublings, no more than two additions and one negation are required
between two multiplications. Atomicity consists then of writing point addition
and point doubling as sequences of this pattern – as many as there are field
multiplications (including squarings).
Therefore this countermeasure induces two kinds of costs:
– Field squarings have to be performed as field multiplications. Then this
approach is costly on embedded devices with dedicated hardware offering
modular squaring operation, i.e. when S/M < 1.
– Dummy additions and negations are added. Their cost is generally negligible
from a theoretical point of view but, as shown in Section 1.3, the cost of such
operations must be taken into account in the context of embedded devices.
To reduce these costs, Longa proposed in his PhD thesis [27, Chap. 5] the
two following atomic patterns in the context of Jacobian coordinates:
(2)


R1 ← R2 · R3
R4 ← −R5
R6 ← R7 +R8
R9 ← R10 ·R11
R12 ← −R13
R14 ← R15 +R16
R17 ← R18 +R19
(3)


R1 ← R2
2
R3 ← −R4
R5 ← R6 +R7
R8 ← R9 ·R10
R11 ← −R12
R13 ← R14 +R15
R16 ← R17 +R18
Compared with atomic pattern (1), these two patterns slightly reduce the
number of field additions (gain of one addition every two multiplications). More-
over, atomic pattern (3) takes advantage of the squaring operation by replacing
one multiplication out of two by a squaring.
In [27, Appendices] Longa expresses mixed affine-Jacobian addition formula
as 6 atomic patterns (2) or (3) and fast doubling formula as 4 atomic patterns (2)
or (3). It allows to perform an efficient left-to-right scalar multiplication using
fast doubling and mixed affine-Jacobian addition protected with atomic patterns
(2) or (3).
3.2 Atomic Left-to-Right Scalar Multiplication
We detail in the following why the Longa’s left-to-right scalar multiplication
using fast doubling and mixed affine-Jacobian addition is not compatible with
our security constraints.
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Defeating DSCA8 requires the randomization of input point coordinates.
This can be achieved by two means: projective coordinates randomization [12]
and random curve isomorphism [23]. The first one allows to use the fast point
doubling formula but prevents the use of mixed additions since input points
P, 3P, . . . have their Z coordinate randomized. On the other hand the random
curve isomorphism keeps input points in affine coordinates but randomizes a
which thus imposes the use of the general doubling formula instead of the fast
one.
Since Longa didn’t investigate general doubling nor readdition, we present in
Appendix A.1 the formulas to perform the former by using 5 atomic patterns (2)
or (3) and in Appendix A.2 the formulas to perform the latter by using 7 atomic
patterns (2). It seems very unlikely that one can express readdition using atomic
pattern (3): since state-of-the-art readdition formula using the S–M trade-off
requires 10 multiplications and 4 squarings, 3 other multiplications would have
to be traded for squarings.
Therefore secure left-to-right scalar multiplication can be achieved either by
using atomic pattern (2) and projective coordinates randomization which would
involve fast doublings and readditions or by using atomic pattern (3) and random
curve isomorphism which would involve general doublings and mixed additions.
3.3 Atomic Right-to-Left Mixed Scalar Multiplication
As suggested in [21] we protected Alg. 2 with atomicity. Since Longa’s atomic
patterns have not been designed for modified Jacobian doubling, we applied
atomic pattern (1) to protect Alg. 2.
The decomposition of general Jacobian addition formula in 16 atomic pat-
terns (1) is given in [9]. Since we haven’t found it in the literature, we present
in Appendix A.3 a decomposition of modified Jacobian doubling formula in 8
atomic patterns (1).
Projective coordinates randomization and random curve isomorphism coun-
termeasures can both be applied to this solution.
3.4 Atomic Scalar Multiplication Algorithms Comparison
We compare in Table 3 the three previously proposed atomically protected algo-
rithms. As discussed in Section 1.3 we fix A/M = 0.2 and N/M = 0.1. Costs are
given as the average number of field multiplications per bit of scalar. Each cost is
estimated for devices providing dedicated modular squaring – i.e. S/M = 0.8 –
or not – i.e. S/M = 1. If extra memory is available, precomputations or postcom-
putations are respectively used to speed up left-to-right and right-to-left scalar
multiplications. The pre/postcomputation cost is here not taken into account
but is constant for every row of the chart.
8 We include in DSCA the Template Attack on ECDSA from [29].
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Nb. of extra
S/M
Left-to-right Left-to-right Right-to-left
points with (2) with (3) with (1)
0
0.8 17.7 18.2 20.0
1 17.7 19.6 20.0
1
0.8 16.1 16.9 18.0
1 16.1 18.2 18.0
2
0.8 15.6 16.5 17.3
1 15.6 17.7 17.3
3
0.8 15.1 16.1 16.8
1 15.1 17.4 16.8
4
0.8 14.9 16.0 16.6
1 14.9 17.2 16.6
Table 3. Cost estimation in field multiplications per bit of the 3 atomically protected
scalar multiplication algorithms with A/M = 0.2.
It appears that in our context atomic left-to-right scalar multiplication using
atomic pattern (2) with fast doubling and readditions is the fastest solution and
is, on average for the 10 rows of Table 3, 10.5% faster than atomic right-to-left
mixed scalar multiplication using atomic pattern (1).
In the next section we present our contribution that aims at minimizing the
atomicity cost by optimizing the atomic pattern. Then we apply it on the right-
to-left mixed scalar multiplication algorithm since efficient patterns are already
known for the two left-to-right variants.
4 Atomic Pattern Improvement
We propose here a twofold atomicity improvement method: firstly, we take ad-
vantage of the fact that a squaring can be faster than a multiplication. Secondly,
we reduce the number of additions and negations used in atomic patterns in
order to increase the efficiency of scalar multiplication.
4.1 First Part: Atomic Pattern Extension
As explained previously, our first idea is to reduce the efficiency loss due to field
squarings turned into multiplications.
Method Presentation. Let O1 and O2 be two atomically written operations
(point addition and doubling in our case) such that they requirem and n atomic
patterns respectively. Let us assume that a sub-operation o1 from the atomic
pattern (field multiplication in our case) could sometimes be replaced by another
preferred sub-operation o2 (such as field squaring). Let us eventually assume that
O1 requires at least m
′ sub-operations o1 (along with m−m
′ sub-operations o2)
and O2 requires at least n
′ sub-operations o1 (along with n− n
′ sub-operations
o2).
12
Then, if d = gcd(m,n) > 1, let e represents the greatest positive integer
satisfying:
e ·
m
d
≤ m−m′ and e ·
n
d
≤ n− n′ . (8)
Since 0 is obviously a solution, it is certain that e is defined. If e > 0 we can now
apply the following method. Let a new pattern be defined with d − e original
atomic patterns followed by e atomic patterns with o2 replacing o1 – the order
can be modified at convenience.
It is now possible to express operations O1 and O2 with m/d and n/d new
patterns respectively. Using the new pattern in O1 (resp. O2) instead of the old
one allows replacing e ·m/d (resp. e · n/d) sub-operations o1 by o2.
Application to Mixed Coordinates Scalar Multiplication. Applying this
method to Alg. 2 yields the following result: O1 being the Jacobian projective
addition, O2 the modified Jacobian projective doubling, o1 the field multiplica-
tion and o2 the field squaring, then m=16, m
′=11, n = 8, n′ = 3, d = 8 and
e = 2. Therefore we define a new temporary atomic pattern composed of 8 pat-
terns (1) where 2 multiplications are replaced by squarings. We thus have one
fourth of the field multiplications carried out as field squarings. This extended
pattern would have to be repeated twice for an addition and once for a doubling.
We applied this new approach in Fig. 2 where atomic general Jacobian ad-
dition and modified Jacobian doubling are rewritten in order to take advantage
of the squarings. We denote by ⋆ the dummy field additions and negations that
must be added to complete atomic patterns.
4.2 Second Part: Atomic Pattern Cleaning-Up
In a second step we aim at reducing the number of dummy field operations. In
Fig. 2, we identified by ⋆ the operations that are never used in Add.1, Add.2
and Dbl. These field operations may then be removed saving up 5 field additions
and 3 field negations per pattern occurrence.
However, we found out that field operations could be rearranged in order
to maximize the number of rows over the three columns composed of dummy
operations only. We then merge negations and additions into subtractions when
possible. This improvement is depicted in Fig. 3.
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Add. 1


R1 ← Z2
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R2 ← X1 ·R1
⋆
⋆
⋆
R1 ← R1 · Z2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R3 ← Y1 ·R1
⋆
⋆
⋆
R1 ← Z1
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R4 ← R1 ·X2
⋆
R4 ← −R4
R4 ← R2 +R4
R1 ← Z1 · R1
⋆
⋆
⋆
R1 ← R1 · Y2
⋆
R1 ← −R1
R1 ← R3 +R1
Add. 2


R6 ← R4
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R5 ← Z1 · Z2
⋆
⋆
⋆
Z3 ← R5 ·R4
⋆
⋆
⋆
R2 ← R2 ·R6
⋆
R1 ← −R1
⋆
R5 ← R1
2
⋆
R3 ← −R3
⋆
R4 ← R4 ·R6
R6 ← R5 +R4
R2 ← −R2
R6 ← R6 +R2
R3 ← R3 ·R4
X3 ← R2 +R6
⋆
R2 ← X3 +R2
R1 ← R1 ·R2
Y3 ← R3 +R1
⋆
⋆
Dbl.


R1 ← X1
2
R2 ← Y1 + Y1
⋆
⋆
Z2 ← R2 · Z1
R4 ← R1 +R1
⋆
⋆
R3 ← R2 · Y1
R6 ← R3 +R3
⋆
⋆
R2 ← R6 ·R3
R1 ← R4 +R1
⋆
R1 ← R1 +W1
R3 ← R1
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R4 ← R6 ·X1
R5 ←W1 +W1
R4 ← −R4
R3 ← R3 +R4
W2 ← R2 ·R5
X2 ← R3 +R4
R2 ← −R2
R6 ← R4 +X2
R4 ← R6 ·R1
⋆
R4 ← −R4
Y2 ← R4 +R2
Fig. 2. Extended atomic pattern applied to Jacobian projective addition and modified
Jacobian projective doubling.
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Add. 1


R1 ← Z2
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R2 ← Y1 · Z2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R5 ← Y2 · Z1
⋆
⋆
⋆
R3 ← R1 · R2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R4 ← Z1
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R2 ← R5 · R4
⋆
⋆
R2 ← R2 −R3
R5 ← R1 ·X1
⋆
⋆
⋆
R6 ← X2 ·R4
⋆
⋆
R6 ← R6 −R5
Add. 2


R1 ← R6
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R4 ← R5 ·R1
⋆
⋆
⋆
R5 ← R1 ·R6
⋆
⋆
⋆
R1 ← Z1 · R6
⋆
⋆
⋆
R6 ← R2
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
Z3 ← R1 · Z2
R1 ← R4 +R4
⋆
R6 ← R6 −R1
R1 ← R5 ·R3
X3 ← R6 −R5
⋆
R4 ← R4 −X3
R3 ← R4 ·R2
⋆
⋆
Y3 ← R3 −R1
Dbl.


R1 ← X1
2
R2 ← Y1 + Y1
⋆
⋆
Z2 ← R2 · Z1
R4 ← R1 +R1
⋆
⋆
R3 ← R2 · Y1
R6 ← R3 +R3
⋆
⋆
R2 ← R6 ·R3
R1 ← R4 +R1
⋆
R1 ← R1 +W1
R3 ← R1
2
⋆
⋆
⋆
R4 ← R6 ·X1
R5 ←W1 +W1
⋆
R3 ← R3 −R4
W2 ← R2 ·R5
X2 ← R3 −R4
⋆
R6 ← R4 −X2
R4 ← R6 ·R1
⋆
⋆
Y2 ← R4 −R2
Fig. 3. Improved arrangement of field operations in extended atomic pattern from
Fig. 2.
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This final optimization now allows us to save up 6 field additions and to
remove the 8 field negations per pattern occurrence. One may note that no more
dummy operation remains in modified Jacobian doubling. We thus believe that
our resulting atomic pattern (4) is optimal for this operation:
(4)


R1 ← R2
2
R3 ← R4 +R5
R6 ← R7 ·R8
R9 ← R10 +R11
R12 ← R13 ·R14
R15 ← R16 +R17
R18 ← R19 ·R20
R21 ← R22 +R23
R24 ← R25 +R26
R27 ← R28
2
R29 ← R30 ·R31
R32 ← R33 +R34
R35 ← R36 −R37
R38 ← R39 ·R40
R41 ← R42 −R43
R44 ← R45 −R46
R47 ← R48 ·R49
R50 ← R51 −R52
4.3 Theoretical Gain
In Table 4 we present the cost of right-to-left mixed scalar multiplication pro-
tected with atomic pattern (4). We also draw up in this chart the gains obtained
over left-to-right and right-to-left algorithms protected with atomic patterns (2)
and (1) respectively.
Nb. of extra
S/M
Right-to-left Gain over Gain over
points with (4) l.-to-r. with (2) r.-to-l. with (1)
0
0.8 16.0M 9.6% 20.0%
1 16.7M 5.6% 16.5%
1
0.8 14.4M 10.6% 20.0%
1 15.0M 6.8% 16.7%
2
0.8 13.9M 10.9% 19.7%
1 14.4M 7.7% 16.8%
3
0.8 13.4M 11.3% 20.2%
1 14.0M 7.3% 16.7%
4
0.8 13.3M 10.7% 19.9%
1 13.8M 7.4% 16.9%
Table 4. Costs estimation in field multiplications per bit of Alg. 2 protected with
improved pattern (4) and comparison with two others methods presented in Table 3
assuming A/M = 0.2.
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Due to our new atomic pattern (4), right-to-left mixed scalar multiplication
turns out to be the fastest among these solutions in every cases. The average
speed-up over pattern (1) is 18.3% and the average gain over left-to-right scalar
multiplication protected with atomic pattern (2) is 10.6% if dedicated squaring
is available or 7.0% otherwise.
4.4 Experimental Results
We have implemented Alg. 2 – without any window method – protected with
the atomic pattern (1) on one hand and with our improved atomic pattern (4)
on the other hand. We used a chip equipped with an 8-bit CPU running at 30
MHz and with a 32-bit crypto-coprocessor running at 50 MHz. In particular, this
crypto-coprocessor provides a dedicated modular squaring. The characteristics
of the corresponding implementation are given in Table 5. On the NIST P-192
curve [17] we obtained a practical speed-up of about 14.5% to be compared
to the predicted 20%. This difference can be explained by the extra software
processing required in the scalar multiplication loop management, especially the
on-the-fly NAF decomposition of the scalar in an SSCA-resistant way.
Timing RAM size Code size
29.6 ms 412 B 3.5 KB
Table 5. Characteristics of our implementation of the atomically protected 192-bit
scalar multiplication on an 8-bit chip with a 32-bit crypto-coprocessor.
When observing the side-channel leakage of our implementation we obtained
the signal presented in Fig. 4. Atomic patterns comprising 8 modular multipli-
cations and several additions/subtractions can easily be identified.
Fig. 4. Side-channel leakage observed during the execution of our scalar multiplication
implementation showing a sequence of atomic patterns.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new atomic pattern for scalar multiplication on el-
liptic curves over Fp and detail our method for atomic pattern improvement. To
achieve this goal, two ways are explored. Firstly we maximize the use of squarings
to replace multiplications since the latter are slower. Secondly we minimize the
use of field additions and negations since they induce a non-negligible penalty.
In particular, we point out that the classical hypothesis taken by scalar multipli-
cation designers to neglect the cost of additions/subtractions in Fp is not valid
when focusing on embedded devices such as smart cards.
In this context our method provides an average 18.3% improvement for the
right-to-left mixed scalar multiplication from [21] protected with the atomic
pattern from [9]. It also provides an average 10.6% gain over the fastest algorithm
identified before our contribution if dedicated squaring is available. Furthermore,
though the topic of this paper is right-to-left scalar multiplication, our atomic
pattern improvement method can be generically used to speed up atomically
protected algorithms.
In conclusion we recommend that algorithm designers, addressing the scope
of embedded devices, take into account additions and subtractions cost when
these operations are heavily used in an algorithm. Moreover the issue of design-
ing efficient atomic patterns should be considered when proposing non regular
sensitive algorithms.
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A Atomic Formulas
A.1 Atomic General Doubling Using Pattern (2) or (3)
The decomposition of a general – i.e. for all a – doubling in Jacobian coordinates
using atomic pattern (3) is depicted hereafter. The corresponding decomposition
using atomic pattern (2) can straightforwardly be obtained by replacing every
squaring by a multiplication using the same operand twice.
The input point is given as (X1, Y1, Z1) and the result is written into the
point (X2, Y2, Z2). Four intermediate registers, R1 to R4, are used.
1


R1 ← X1
2
⋆
R3 ← R1 +R1
R2 ← Z1 · Z1
⋆
R1 ← R1 +R3
R4 ← X1 +X1
4


R2 ← R1
2
⋆
⋆
R4 ← R4 · R3
R4 ← −R4
R2 ← R2 +R4
X2 ← R2 +R4
2


R2 ← R2
2
⋆
⋆
R2 ← a ·R2
⋆
R1 ← R1 +R2
R2 ← Y1 + Y1
5


R3 ← R3
2
R1 ← −R1
R4 ← X2 +R4
R1 ← R1 · R4
R3 ← −R3
R3 ← R3 +R3
Y2 ← R3 +R1
3


R3 ← Y1
2
⋆
⋆
Z2 ← Z1 ·R2
⋆
R3 ← R3 +R3
⋆
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A.2 Atomic Readdition Using Pattern (2)
The decomposition of a readdition in Jacobian coordinates using atomic pattern
(2) is depicted hereafter.
The input points are given as (X1, Y1, Z1), (X2, Y2, Z2) and the result is
written into the point (X3, Y3, Z3). Seven intermediate registers, R1 to R7, are
used.
1


R1 ← Y2 · Z1
3
⋆
⋆
R2 ← Y1 · Z2
⋆
⋆
⋆
5


R5 ← R5 ·R3
⋆
⋆
R3 ← Z2 · R3
⋆
⋆
⋆
2


R3 ← Z2 · Z2
⋆
⋆
R4 ← R2 ·R3
R5 ← −R1
R4 ← R4 +R5
⋆
6


R7 ← R4 · R4
⋆
⋆
Z3 ← R3 · Z1
R5 ← −R5
R7 ← R7 +R6
X3 ← R7 +R5
3


R2 ← X2 · Z1
2
⋆
⋆
R3 ← X1 · R3
R5 ← −R2
R3 ← R3 +R5
⋆
7


R3 ← R1 ·R5
R1 ← −X3
R2 ← R2 +R1
R1 ← R2 ·R4
⋆
Y3 ← R1 +R3
⋆
4


R5 ← R3 ·R3
⋆
⋆
R2 ← R2 ·R5
R6 ← −R2
R6 ← R6 +R6
⋆
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A.3 Atomic Modified Jacobian Coordinates Doubling Using
Pattern (1)
The decomposition of a doubling in modified Jacobian coordinates using atomic
pattern (1) is depicted hereafter.
The input point is given as (X1, Y1, Z1) and the result is written into the
point (X2, Y2, Z2). Six intermediate registers, R1 to R6, are used.
1


R1 ← X1 ·X1
R2 ← Y1 + Y1
⋆
⋆
5


R3 ← R1 ·R1
⋆
⋆
⋆
2


Z2 ← R2 · Z1
R4 ← R1 +R1
⋆
⋆
6


R4 ← R6 ·X1
R5 ←W1 +W1
R4 ← −R4
R3 ← R3 +R4
3


R3 ← R2 · Y1
R6 ← R3 +R3
⋆
⋆
7


W2 ← R2 · R5
X2 ← R3 +R4
R2 ← −R2
R6 ← R4 +X2
4


R2 ← R6 · R3
R1 ← R4 +R1
⋆
R1 ← R1 +W1
8


R4 ← R6 ·R1
⋆
R4 ← −R4
Y2 ← R4 +R2
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